By S. Saravana Kumar
This article was first published in the The Edge Malaysia, 6 August 2018.
The Customs Appeal Tribunal was introduced in 2007 through
an amendment to the Customs Act 1967 (CA 1967). Section 141B of CA 1967
established the Customs Appeal Tribunal to hear appeals from taxpayers who were
aggrieved by the decision of the Director-General of Customs (DG). Prior to the
establishment of the tribunal, such appeals were heard by the minister of
finance. If taxpayers were dissatisfied with the minister’s decision, they
could appeal to the High Court by way of judicial review.
Under the soon-to-be-implemented Sales and Services Tax
(SST), taxpayers who are aggrieved by a decision of the DG on SST matters may
also appeal to the tribunal.
Judicial review
Notwithstanding the existence of the tribunal, established
multinational corporations have opted to bypass this appeal process and
commence their appeal by of judicial review. Some of these cases, such as Levi
Strauss (M) Sdn Bhd v Ketua Pengarah Kastam, Malaysia (Levi Strauss), were
reported in the law journals. In Levi Strauss, the taxpayer challenged the
imposition of additional customs duty and selas tax on it by way of adjustment
of royalty pursuant to regulation 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Customs (Rules of
Valuation) Regulations 1999. It was a technical issue that involved the
interpretation of various provisions of the law and working papers of the World
Trade Organization. However, under the old consumption tax regime, the tribunal
did not allow the taxpayer to be represented by an advocate and solicitor,
which then resulted in the taxpayer seeking legal remedy by way of judicial
review.
At present, there is a proposed amendment to the CA 1967
before the parliament to remove this restriction by allowing taxpayers to be
represented by any person of their choice.
This article highlights that on certain matters, taxpayers
may proceed directly to the High Court by way of judicial review if they are
dissatisfied with the DG’s decision under the soon-to-be-implemented SST
regime. In other words, can taxpayers proceed directly to the High Court despite
the existence of the tribunal or a similar tribunal under SST? It is
anticipated that any appeal against the decision of the DG under the new regime
will be forwarded to the tribunal.
The Levi Strauss case
In Levi Strauss, the taxpayer applied for leave from the
High Court for an order of certiorari to quash the DG’s decision to raise a
bill of demand for additional taxes and pending the leave application, the
taxpayers sought to stay the enforcement of the decision.
The attorney-general (AG), however, raise a preliminary
objection to the taxpayer’s application on the premise that the taxpayer’s
application was premature and misconceived. The AG took the position that the
taxpayer should have filed its appeal before the tribunal and not the High
Court. The taxpayer disagreed with that position and both parties were
instructed by the High Court to file their written submissions. However, at the
eleventh hour before the hearing, the AG withdrew his objection. Consequently,
the High Court granted the taxpayer leave to apply for judicial review and
stayed the enforcement of the decision pending the determination of the
application.
The crux of the taxpayer’s submission was that the
availability of an alternative remedy (that is, the Customs Appeal Tribunal)
does not exclude judicial review. The following grounds, which are discussed
below, were raised by the taxpayer in support of its application for judicial
review:
(a) The Sungai Gelugor case;
(b) The tribunal is not specialised;
(c) The tribunal is domestic;
(d) Section 141N of CA 1967; and
(e) The court's powers are not restricted by CA 1967.